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Abstract 
 
 
Cyberwar challenges future endeavors of state security.  As technological 
capability has improved, and access to information has become more widespread 
the importance of the issue in today's ever-globalizing world grows each day.  A 
primary objective is to evaluate the place of cyber-warfare against nation-states 
and any repercussions under an international law paradigm.  Utilizing an English 
School perspective, emphasis will be applied to the argument that disruptive 
circumstances could come to fruition if international conventions are not created 
to bring consensus and order among nation-states on this subject.  This study 
hypothesizes that a future application could be an agreement under international 
law, beyond current regional cooperative initiatives. Since cyber-related attack is 
a relatively new development, the issue lacks adequate historical context. In 
addition, since state behavior is a major contributor to the interpretation of 
international law, the matter is in need of a clear delineation of the norms that 
define the phenomena and what acceptable responses might entail.  Case study 
analysis will highlight recent examples of state behavior and cyber-related 
attacks and sabotages. 
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
 An Information Week article states that in 2010, cyber-attacks in U.S. 
federal networks rose 39% since a year prior, reporting 41,776 malicious cyber 
incidents (Montalbano, 2011). Clarke and Knake claim that, “on average in 2009, 
a new type or variant of malware was entering cyberspace every 202 seconds” 
(Clarke and Knake, 2010).  As technological capability has improved, and access 
to information has become more widespread the importance of the issue in 
today's ever-globalizing world has become more vital than ever.  Cyberwar is an 
example of technological advancement that challenges future endeavors of state 
security.  Cyberwar can be defined as, “actions by a nation-state to penetrate 
another nation’s computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or 
disruption” (Clarke and Knake, 2010).  Cyberwar and its relevance in 
international security matters continues to be a pivotal issue as technological 
opportunity is more accessible to greater numbers of the population.     
 In addition to briefly exploring types of cyber-attacks for the purposes of 
inquiry, I look to answer an important question:  Is international law currently 
equipped to effectively advise nation-states on the question of cyber-warfare, or 
does the issue of cyberwar against nation-states require new norms of 
international law?  Emphasis will be given to the argument that disruptive 
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circumstances, worse than those already realized, could come to fruition in 
today’s technologically sophisticated times, if international conventions are not 
created to bring consensus among nation-states on necessary protections on this 
subject.  In light of this danger, one could ask if international law might offer an 
opportunity for agreement among members of the international community as to 
protections from various types of cyberwar and appropriate responses to cyber-
attacks once they have occurred.     
 This effort will analyze case studies of various examples of cyber-attack on 
nation-states.  I analyze the Estonian cyber-attack of 2007, the Russian-Georgian 
conflict of 2008, as well as the Stuxnet and Flame infiltrations of Iranian systems 
to gain a foundation for further analysis.  Case studies of recent cyber-related 
incidents among nation-states demonstrate their relevance in today's world 
climate and help to identify and categorize cyber-attacks. Case studies, “permit a 
deeper understanding of causal processes, the explication of general explanatory 
theory, and the development of hypotheses regarding difficult-to-observe 
phenomenon” (Johnson, Reynolds and Mycoff, 2008).  This study cannot 
reasonably claim to account for every feature of the cyber-attacks in question, 
for that is another endeavor entirely.  Rather, the intention is to afford 
assessment of the examples to establish classification of the types of attack and 
any observable objective in the attempted attack. 
 This study hypothesizes that a future agreed upon norm could be an 
agreement within international law, beyond current regional cooperative 
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initiatives.  Through case studies, I examine behavior among states regarding 
cyber-related attacks and sabotages.  I argue that the international community 
will be forced to come to consensus on the issue of cyberwar among nation-
states, in the form of newly formed norms of international law.  Kanuck argues, 
“Without any controlling legal authorities for cyber conflicts today, there remains 
broad room for maneuver—both diplomatically and militarily” (Kanuck, 2010).  
Since state behavior is a major contributor to interpretation of international law, 
the lack of consensus leads to the initial conclusion that cyber-related attack is a 
relatively new development.  Therefore, the issue lacks adequate historical 
context and is in need of a clear delineation of the norms that define the 
phenomena and what acceptable responses might entail (retorsion, retaliation, 
sanctions). 
 This direction is not without precedent.  Sofaer and Goodman state, 
“Those who support adoption of a multilateral approach to deal with this 
quintessentially transnational problem must be encouraged by the fact that 
states have consistently adopted multilateral solutions to deal with technologies 
that affect populations across national boundaries” (Sofaer and Goodman, 2001). 
British Foreign Secretary Hague has called for nations to discuss “norms for state 
behavior in cyberspace” (Farnsworth, 2011).  Following the documented cyber-
attack on Estonia of 2007, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was 
unable to act, lacking a previously agreed upon response to such an incident; 
however, at the 20th NATO Summit in 2008 in Bucharest, the group formally 
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addressed cyber-attacks (Hathaway, et al. 2012).   Hughes notes that following 
the summit, two new NATO divisions were created in order to focus on the threat 
of cyber-attacks:  The Cyber Defence Management Authority and the Cooperative 
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (Hughes, 2009).  The example of NATO and 
its cyber defense initiatives created as a result of the 2008 Bucharest Summit do 
not necessarily qualify as a widespread and inclusive endeavor.  Still, it does 
highlight the possibility of multilateral cooperation and agreement among states 
regarding the issue of cyberwar.  Agreement on application is vague at this 
stage, but members continue dialogue on the matter (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2012).  The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, which 
entered into effect in 2004, includes thirty member states, including the United 
States.  This treaty was created to allow for interoperability among national laws 
and greater cooperation among member states.  However, similar to the NATO 
initiatives, progress has been slow and direction has lacked focus.  Furthermore, 
many other states, such as China, Brazil and Russia have not signed it, 
undermining its applicability in a practical sense.   
 In addition to the noted agreements above, the United Nations (UN) 
Charter states, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member 
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security” (Article 51).  As it pertains to cyber-
attack, Benatar shows that a broad interpretation of Article 2(4) of the UN 
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Charter could lead one to “…demonstrate that cyber-attacks are perhaps not a 
new kind of force but instead a new kind of armed force” (Benatar, 2009).  
Interestingly, jus ad bellum (the right to war) does not categorize which 
weaponry is authorized, and Benatar states that the legality or the question 
thereof with regards to cyber force is difficult to ascertain.  However, Benatar 
(referencing Schmitt, Harrison, Dinniss, Wingfield and Kelsey) does reference the 
International Telecommunications Convention, the laws of neutrality, and 
international humanitarian law as those norms that may be challenged by the 
use of cyber force. 
 Conversely, some opponents argue against an international convention on 
cyber-warfare. These challengers claim that independent and autonomous efforts 
on the parts of states should be the main prospect.  Any international convention 
only serves to limit state opportunity to create its own framework to handle 
cyberwar.  In addition, there is the question of, “…ambiguities that will prevent 
any meaningful international discourse and resolution from taking place” (Muir, 
2011).  Muir sees the issue strictly from an American perspective, as the world 
leader in cyber operations.  Muir claims that unilateral action on the part of the 
United States is the correct course of action in attaining what he sees as the four 
goals for, “…The development of a legal regime around cyber warfare (Muir, 
2011):  
1) Protect the full panoply of property rights 
2) Minimize cyber-attacks and reduce their collateral damage 
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3) Deter the use of proxies in the commission of cyber-attacks 
4) Provide legal recourse for aggrieved parties” 
Muir’s argument for the disadvantageousness to the United States of an 
international agreement, calling for the unilateral action on the part of the United 
States to attain the above goals clearly falls in the classical realist camp.  
However, enlightened realists could argue that it may be in the best interests of 
the state to enter into international agreements on cyber-warfare.  The realist 
perspective will be briefly described later in this paper.  
Conversely, some argue that the issue of cyberwar is not a relevant issue.  
Rid argues that cyberwar is not a separate threat at all.  He claims that cyberwar 
is simply, “sophisticated versions of three activities that are as old as warfare 
itself:  subversion, espionage and sabotage” (Rid, 2012).  Citing Clausewitz on 
“the most concise concept of war,” Rid claims that past cyber-attacks do not 
meet the criteria of an act of war: violent character, instrumentality as a means 
to an end and political nature.  Rid does not believe that there will be any 
comparatively large-scale event on the scale of the Hiroshima attack or the Pearl 
Harbor attack of World War II, and to compare cyberwar to nuclear war is 
“misplaced and problematic”  (Rid, 2012).  I argue that Rid is in the marginal 
perspective and his argument a naïve view of the issue. 
Others will find Rid in the minority.  They argue that as the nations of the 
world continue to mature in their technological advances, the progression leads 
to reliance on these capabilities.  Critical infrastructures can come under extreme 
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duress, and “it is easy to imagine far more momentous and malicious information 
attacks that, by disabling infrastructures or causing them to malfunction, could 
impose economic hardship on citizens, physically harm them, impair military 
operations, or undermine confidence in global and national financial and 
commodities markets by introducing erroneous information” (Grove, Goodman 
and Lukasik, 2000).  The authors argue that access to cheap computer 
processing equipment, greater network speeds and the increasing 
interdependency of infrastructures only exacerbate the inevitability and 
magnitude of such possibilities.  They propose active defenses through the 
imposition of penalties under international law and making failure an expensive 
proposition, such as damaging the attacking equipment.  Active defense systems 
may be useful in the protection of infrastructure elements, such as nuclear power 
plants.  By extension, the authors also argue that, “Interpretations of the UN 
Charter and of the laws of armed combat will have to evolve accordingly in order 
to accommodate the novel definitions of the use of force that such attacks imply” 
(Grove, Goodman and Lukasik, 2000).  The end result is the potentiality for 
consensus and establishing legal standards on this rapidly escalating issue.  Such 
consensus is pivotal for international law to offer any guidance. 
 Kanuck points to the 1990s as the decade in which “efforts to analyze 
‘information warfare’ under international law” took shape (Kanuck, 2010).  He 
argues that states try to “exercise their sovereignty over cyberspace” (Kanuck, 
2010).  The challenge of cyberspace to the conception of physical boundaries 
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that is so endemic to international law makes the effort to exercise sovereignty a 
unique undertaking.  It is not simply a question of state government influence, 
but also that of private companies and sometimes a combination of the two 
entities.  Kanuck states, “Once one appreciates that governments seek to extend 
their sovereign authority into this new realm, it then becomes necessary to 
analyze how their interests may align or conflict in regard to nonexclusive 
resources” (Kanuck, 2010).  Therefore, Kanuck argues in favor of collective 
standards where unilateral action is not the answer. 
 Hollis reasons for these norms, claiming that attribution is a great 
challenge.  Hollis states, “I argue that international law needs a new norm for 
cybersecurity:  a duty to assist or DTA” (Hollis, 2011).  Utilizing the classic “SOS” 
maritime idea, this line of reasoning removes the burden of attribution, elevating 
the need to mitigate harm.  If norms existed that could help regulate cyber 
threats through a collectively agreed upon duty to assist, attackers may be 
deterred from trying in the first place.     
As stated previously, the study intends to argue for the importance of 
international law in addressing future responses to cyberwar.  Theoretically, this 
line of reasoning would incorporate liberal ideals.  Cooperation, rather than direct 
competition or confrontation as seen from the perspective of the realist camp, 
would be the protocol used to respond to the issue of cyberwar.  However, it 
should be noted that states do indeed participate in an anarchical arrangement.  
Still, this arrangement also includes the fact that states recognize their shared 
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interests in many areas to promote cooperation, or at least follow a set of norms 
that maintains peaceful patterns of behavior.   
 In response to the background noted above, an English School perspective 
will be used in this line of inquiry.  The English School stresses the idea of an 
international society as the object of analysis (Linklater, 2009).  Scholars such as 
Hedley Bull, Martin Wight and more recently, Nicholas Wheeler and Barry Buzan 
are seen as influential English School thinkers.  The English School could be best 
understood as a middle-ground between liberalism and realism. On one hand, 
the English School sees the international system as more civil than realists care 
to acknowledge.  Conversely, the English School sees that conflict can and does 
occur in an international society, “at odds with utopians who believe in the 
possibility of perpetual peace” (Linklater, 2009).  Indeed, “For Martin Wight, the 
theory of international society represents an alternative to realism and idealism 
in the study of international relations” (Griffiths, Roach and Solomon, 2009).  To 
argue further,   “Bull claims that the 'institutions' of the society of states (war, 
great powers, maneuvers, international law, diplomacy and the balance of 
power) are crucial in maintaining international order” (Griffiths, Roach and 
Solomon, 2009).  International law aims to perpetuate orderly international 
relationships in an effort to create a foundation based on customary norms of 
behavior.  This would help limit the potential for escalating tensions among 
states. 
 Nations that find that their interests do not align with a peaceful course of 
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action or do not wish to cooperate or dialogue, may flout norms set forth among 
states in an international society.  That would indeed fall within the theorization 
of an anarchical system.  It could be argued that a recent proclaimed unilateral 
response on the part of the United States in response to an attack on its 
informational infrastructure would qualify as a response that the realist would 
certainly see as rational.  However, the intention of this research is to 
demonstrate potential agreement and consensus, and argue that the 
international community must acquiesce to dialogue and cooperation in this 
instance.   
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Chapter Two: 
Realism, Liberalism and the English School: Competing Perspectives on 
International Law 
Realism and liberalism, two of the great tenets of International Relations 
scholarship, resonate from opposite ends of the IR field.  On one hand, realism 
places emphasis on the anarchical affairs of states, in that there is no power that 
oversees states in their quests for what is in their self-interests.  As a result, a 
self-help system permeates the international climate.  Conversely, liberalism 
highlights progressiveness and cooperation among states, rather than 
competition.  With this understanding, how do the competing sides see 
international law?  How do the perspectives see international law with respect to 
states in a cyber-world? 
 
Realism 
Realism and its more recent iteration, neo-realism, counts among its 
advocates Thomas Hobbes, Niccolo Machiavelli, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth 
Waltz.  These visionaries of Real Politik claimed that the world is governed not by 
some international authority, but by power and the continuous struggle to attain 
it.  The solitary end lies in securing one’s self-interest.  In this case, the “one” is 
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the State, and the State is the highest authority among many competing 
authorities.  Realists agree that the product of such an arrangement is anarchy.  
This conception of anarchy is not to be confused with utter chaos, but is simply a 
situation without any single entity having absolute authority over a plethora of 
agents (states).  In addition to this lack of governable authority over states, 
realism claims that the previously mentioned aspect of self-interest is what drives 
states towards their ends.  In being selfish, a state looks out for itself, and as 
Waltz suggests, “puts itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no 
one else can be counted on to do so” (Waltz, 1979).  It has also been argued 
that morality itself is not to be an aim of the state.  By extension, states should 
also not be measured in terms of their morality.  Morgenthau declares, “The 
actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments 
but by considerations of interest and power” (Morgenthau, 1970). 
Where does this leave the realist perspective as it relates to the concept of 
international law, and more specifically cyberwar under an international 
normative regime?  Waltz and Morgenthau clearly argue on behalf of a 
perspective that does not sympathize with pursuing moral objectives as an end in 
themselves.  Russell notes, “Unlike the solitary individual who may claim the 
right to judge political action by universal ethical guidelines, the statesman will 
always make his decision on the basis of the state’s interest” (as cited in 
Donnelly, 2000).  Further, Schwarzenberger emphasizes that international 
morality, like international law, “is both subservient to power politics 
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and…ﬂourishes best where it does not interfere with the international struggle 
for power” (as cited in Donnelly, 2000).  Carr argues that, “no ethical standards 
are applicable to relations between states” (as cited in Donnelly, 2000).  
Morgenthau agrees, “…universal moral principles cannot be applied to the 
actions of states” (as cited in Donnelly, 2000).  Under these pretenses, it would 
be short-sighted to ask one of the realist perspective to even consider following 
normative rules, unless those rules align with their perceived self-interest.  Rules 
are not in the best interests of a state that can otherwise exercise power to 
achieve its aims.  As it relates to cyber-warfare, any international convention 
limiting or prohibiting such cyber activities on the part of a state could possibly 
be seen as inconsequential and therefore illogical to follow.  Other enlightened 
realists could argue that it may be in the best interests of the state to enter into 
international agreements on cyber-warfare.  States operating under the realist 
perspective would follow what is in their best interests and circumvent or follow 
any international agreements, if they deem that to be the course of action to 
take.   
Conversely, Carr argues, “it is an unreal kind of realism which ignores the 
element of morality in any world order” (as cited in Donnelly, 2000).  Also, “…the 
rules of international law constitute treaties, which by making possible the 
creation of international obligations respond to one of the most serious 
deﬁciencies of Hobbesian anarchy…and regulative institutions of various sorts can 
substantially alter the interactions of even powerful states.” (Donnelly, 2000)  
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This particular statement questions a great assumption found in realism:  that 
the international landscape is one made up of an anarchical arrangement with no 
oversight over the states involved.  The constraints and obligations found within 
an international society such as those of treaties found in international law 
indicate that there are behaviors that states are willing to agree on.  Treaties 
may help inhibit powerful states from acting in a manner that is unacceptable to 
other parties under the agreement.  Such inhibition hardly lines up with an 
entirely anarchical arrangement. 
 
Liberalism  
Another great pillar of International Relations theory is liberalism, which 
“emphasizes individual rights, constitutionalism, democracy and limitations on 
the powers of the state” (Burchill, 2009).  Liberalism includes such supporters as 
Karl Deutsch, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Keohane, and Michael Doyle.  Contrary 
to the outside-in approach of realism, Fukuyama argues for an inside-out 
approach.  Fukuyama notes that domestic, internal political orders with liberal-
democratic ideals are seen as the vehicle to end international conflict (Burchill, 
2009).  Indeed, liberalism finds the liberal-democratic world to be in a zone of 
peace, rather than conflict.  Fukuyama claims, “a world made up of liberal 
democracies…should have much less incentive for war, since all nations would 
reciprocally recognize one another’s legitimacy” (Fukuyama, 1992). 
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Liberalism does not acknowledge the concept of a “zero-sum” game in the 
way realism does.  Herz states that, “the mitigation, channeling, balancing, or 
control of power has prevailed perhaps more often than the inevitability of power 
politics would leave one to believe”  (as cited in Donnelly, 2000).  Burchill 
elaborates: “Mutual benefits arising out of cooperation are possible because 
states are not always preoccupied with relative gains – hence the opportunities 
for constructing regimes around issues and areas of common concern” (Burchill, 
2009).  Keohane and Nye also note that states, as members of international 
institutions can broaden their conception of their self-interests to better cultivate 
potential cooperation.  Further, Keohane and Nye argue that fulfilling obligations 
of these international organizations can limit the pursuits of national interest, 
thereby subverting the “meaning and appeal of state sovereignty” (as cited in 
Burchill, 2009).   
The defenders of the liberal mindset are also met with challenges.  
Globalization offers a great example of such a challenge.  Hobsbawm claims that 
three areas of state authority have been limited by globalization:  state 
monopolies of coercion by force, loyalty to the state from its citizens and finally, 
government capacity to supply public services due to liberal market forces.  
Overall, Hobsbawm notes:  “The state as an essential unit of liberal democracy is 
weakening while public antipathy to globalization grows” (as cited in Burchill, 
2009).   
16 
 
Where does this leave the liberal perspective as it relates to cyberwar 
under the auspices of international law?  Is the weakening of state interference 
in the face of market liberalization necessarily a good thing, as lobbied for by 
liberalism?  Can the market be relied upon for solutions to international 
problems?  One could argue that liberalism does not offer an effective alternative 
to realism, because state authority has been weakened through globalization.  
This weakness perpetuates challenges to state sovereignty, and thereby 
participation under an international law paradigm.  Some may defend liberal 
internationalism in its advocacy for democracy, free trade and essential human 
rights.   
Realists could counter the weakening of state sovereignty as argued by 
Keohane and Nye with the important observation that only states may act as 
agents which may influence international law.  The state, as an agent under the 
scope of international law, is subjugated to a multiplicity of globalizing forces 
outside its control.  Nevertheless, while these external forces threaten its 
sovereignty, the state still has not had any serious competitor to its status as the 
primary unit of analysis.  International law is in place to afford states a 
framework for the stability of relations amongst one another.  Cooperation, as a 
noted cornerstone to the liberalist mindset, undermines any need for such a 
framework to even exist.  Therefore, this framework of stability indicates that 
cooperation is not enough to allow states to peacefully concur on issues of 
pivotal importance.  Indeed, cooperative initiatives have been constructed, such 
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as The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime among others.  However, the central 
idea in this thesis calling for international law to bring consensus on the issue of 
cyber-warfare supports the notion that minimal efforts at cooperation and 
unregulated market liberalization alone do not offer sufficient solutions to this 
global phenomenon.   
This chapter has briefly described both realist and liberal perspectives, and 
the polarized nature of their positions as two of the great creeds of International 
Relations scholarship.  With the understanding noted earlier, the competing sides 
see international law with respect to states in a cyber-world in very different 
views.  Realism does not sympathize with a system of normative rules and 
customs by which states are to be bound.  The idea directly contrasts with the 
self-help system that realism extols.  Liberalism takes the opposite approach, in 
that international institutions may offer an arrangement where international 
obligations offer great opportunity for cooperation, but at the cost of potentially 
subverting national sovereignty.  Market liberalization could weaken the state’s 
ability to act as an authority, particularly when market forces undermine state 
ability to provide services to citizens that may already have shaky loyalty.  In a 
liberal world of blurring borders, power becomes less tangible, whereas realism 
has been much more assured in where power rests.  It has also already been 
noted that institutions such as international law and the United Nations only 
recognize states as agents, thereby reasserting the importance of the state. 
With these ideas in mind, another hybrid perspective is available which 
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offers the understanding of an anarchical arrangement of states and power seen 
in realism, merged with a greater perceived propensity for normative behavior 
and cooperation among nations found in liberalism, without challenging state 
sovereignty.  The expectation from an international community of states of its 
individual members allows for customs to emerge, which is a main facet to 
international law.  International law creates an environment where states are 
expected to act in a manner consistent with rules agreed upon by its members.  
Such an international society made up of sovereign entities is the foundation for 
the English School theory of international relations. 
 
The English School 
The English School offers a perspective that may be seen as a “middle 
ground” to those competing ideals of the realist and liberal camps. The term via 
media is frequently utilized in English School theory, referring to this “middle 
ground.”  Indeed, one could see the English School as the proverbial synthesis to 
realism’s thesis and liberalism’s antithesis.  Linklater summarizes the English 
School: “The foundational claim of the English School is that sovereign states 
form a society, but an anarchic one since they do not have to submit to a higher 
power…members of the English School are attracted by elements of realism and 
idealism, yet gravitate towards the middle ground, never wholly reconciling 
themselves to either point of view” (Linklater, 2009).  The English School 
emphasizes the lack of an overarching government in the international society.  
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In essence, the English School argues that the international system is more civil 
than realists would care to admit.   
Bull claims such sociability among nations exists, “through their sense of 
shared interests and values, through their obedience to rules of international law, 
and through their participation in international institutions to regulate the 
conduct of international actors” (as cited in Keene, 2009).  By extension, they 
find the notion of perpetual peace utopian and naïve.  Principally, the English 
School and its proponents look to better understand the, “processes that 
transform systems of states into societies of states and in the norms and 
institutions that prevent the collapse of civility and the emergence of unbridled 
power” (Linklater, 2009).  Linklater’s point with respect to “unbridled power” as it 
relates to the English School’s attempts to mitigate it within a society of states is 
important.  The English School challenges the tenet of power found in realism, 
such as Muir’s previous assertion of unilateral action on the part of the United 
States to achieve what he believes an international convention cannot. However, 
it is also important to note that the state is still the primary actor in an 
international society of states, and therefore challenges the liberalist perspective.  
Wight alludes to the “Grotian Tradition” (as cited in Linklater, 2009), where 
the English School can trace its beginnings.  During a time of conflict between 
Catholics and Protestants, Hugo Grotius imagined an international society which 
would promote coexistence.  In fact, Wight himself “lamented the way in which 
debates between realism and utopianism…had neglected the via media with its 
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distinctive focus on international society” (Linklater, 2009).  Bull concurs with 
respect to the importance of an international society, stating that it was up to, 
“intelligent and sensitive persons” to take visions of “a world society or 
community” seriously (as cited in Linklater, 2009).  One of the visionaries of the 
English School, Hedley Bull has been a proponent of the international society 
found in an otherwise anarchical environment.  After all, anarchy is, “what states 
make of it” (Wendt, 1992). 
Wilson notes that, “One of the deﬁning features of the English School is 
the emphasis it places on normative rules, and in particular the rules of 
international law” (Wilson, 2009). Wilson also cites James: “For members of the 
English School, international law ‘stands at the very centre of the international 
society’s normative framework’” (as cited in Wilson, 2009).   The contrast to the 
realist perspective is distinguished: “…it should be seen as a body of rules, 
deemed by those to whom it applies as binding, the purpose of which is to 
facilitate regular, continuous, and generally orderly international relationships”  
(Wilson, 2009).  Wilson is explaining the emphasis placed on an international 
society by English School scholars, and that normative rules govern behavior of 
states.  Inferred is the need for these rules to govern behaviors of otherwise 
competitive states in an anarchical arrangement.  The English School 
understands the anarchical arrangement and attempts to create an environment 
where states are recognized as individuals with notable positions on issues.  By 
granting a voice to each member of the community, and with each voice equal in 
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weight, states may better understand what is acceptable versus not acceptable.  
States are also made aware of possible responses to activities based on 
customary practices.  Adding such expectations to the proceedings, “helps 
reduce the degree of unpredictability in international affairs…Sense can thus only 
be made of international law by making sense of international society” (Wilson, 
2009). Mayall agrees regarding international law, noting it is “the bedrock 
institution on which the idea of international society stands or fall” (Mayall, 
2000).   
 English School scholars are at odds with realists and neo-realists with 
respect to the question of legitimacy.  This is due to realism’s lack of emphasis 
on the difficulties of legitimacy internal to the state as well as the international 
legitimacy among nations.  Bull argued that safeguarding national sovereignty 
would allow nations comfort in the notion that they may promote whichever 
internal policies they wish, while still being recognized as legitimate in the eyes 
of other states (Linklater, 2009).  On the other hand, the question of order 
versus justice is of high concern in the English School, and it leaves the theory 
with a quandary.  The international order of things is agreeable among nations, 
as the question of sovereignty has been effectively assuaged, but the sense of 
justice is in the eyes of the beholder. 
 This wavering idea of justice can be explained by the example of human 
rights, and its somewhat metamorphic definition which is dependent upon whom 
you ask.  Bull argues that, “the long-term trend over recent decades has 
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favoured the introduction of solidarist measures to promote the international 
protection of human rights (as cited in Linklater, 2009).  When Bull refers to 
“solidarist” measures, he denotes the rights of the individual and calling for 
greater cooperation and consensus of a greater range of issues among states 
more consistent with the liberal perspective.  In contrast and sympathetic to 
realism, pluralism refers to the above discussed question of sovereignty and the 
lack of intervention and cooperation on the part of the international society 
members.  This does not necessarily lessen the importance of sovereignty 
however, though members are to mutually recognize each other as equals:  a 
precondition for international law.  In the case of human rights, the solidarist 
perspective, as argued by Vincent can qualify the basic fundamental human right 
to be free from starvation.  While extreme differences over negative versus 
positive human rights claims may exist, almost all can agree that global attention 
to malnutrition can lead to action among all of humanity (as cited in Linklater, 
2009).  The question of order (most often a Western ideal) and justice (non-
Western in general) can become moot, as solidarity on issues such as Human 
Rights becomes the norm.  By extension, international law can be the vehicle 
used to create consensus on such important matters, as exhibited by the 
International Declaration of Human Rights.   
As discussed above, the English School offers a perspective that harnesses 
the ideals of an international society of states, including a perpetuation of 
international law which governs state behavior.  An order emerges, and norms 
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are found to mitigate international capriciousness.  While such fickle behavior 
among states is simply lessened and not entirely eliminated, international law 
serves to enhance the order among states and to an extent, impart a sense of 
justice among members.  International law brings legitimacy to nations who 
contribute to order amongst the anarchy.  Against the backdrop of international 
cooperation with the question of state interests included amongst the dynamic 
world of international relations, international law indeed offers consensus as to 
how states ought to behave.  It is in this environment, where international 
consensus on important matters has been observed.  Examples such as the 
International Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, among others are noted in this 
regard.  With this foundation for international law in place, the question of cyber-
warfare can be better evaluated as to whether it is even reasonable to consider 
the issue relevant to international relations and international law. 
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Chapter Three: 
Classifying Cyber-Attacks 
Shifting in direction from the theoretical line of inquiry, it is now important 
to describe cyber-attacks.  Later in this work, I will show what a cyber-attack is 
capable of in recent case studies.  The present question is how can such activity 
accomplish such grand ends?  What kinds of cyber-attack exist today, and what 
do they look to achieve?  While entire volumes of intellectual findings are 
available on this topic alone, I look to very briefly explain cyber-attack methods 
used today in order to garner a general level of understanding.  This helps the 
reader to better grasp the threats involved in this area as well as create a 
foundation for inquiry. 
 
Defining Cyberwar 
Some confusion exists in defining cyberwar.  Azarov and Dodonov state 
that, “…in spite of the fact that terms information war, netwar, and cyberwar 
have distinctions in problem areas, all of them are frequently used in parallel with 
the purpose of adaptation in mass consciousness of various social layers – from 
government officials to the general public” (Azarov and Dodonov, 2006).   In 
short, the interchanging usage of these terms exists so that general audiences 
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may garner a familiarity with the issues inherent to the discussion.  As mentioned 
previously, for the purposes of this thesis, former Special Advisor on Cyber-
security under President G.W. Bush, Richard A. Clarke defines cyberwar as,  
“…actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks 
for the purposes of causing damage or disruption” (Clarke and Knake, 2010).  
The method of the attack, an example of which is the Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) designed to disrupt operations on a grand scale, is simply the 
means of the attack.  To clarify types of cyber-attack, it is important to 
understand the scale of these attacks, and what objective is to be attained. 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt mention, “…when we think about ‘cyber’, we need to 
reflect on the Greek root – ‘kybernan’, which means to control or to govern” 
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997).  Therefore, a cyber-attack is an attack meant to 
control or govern.  This surmises that the end result is not necessarily to destroy.  
Azarov and Dodonov agree:  “…the purpose of cyberwar is not destruction but 
control interception of information resources, systems and channels, which can 
be formally expressed as a process of changing of adversary control vectors 
according to the attacker’s reference vectors…the modern information systems in 
cyberspace will be attacked with purposes not only for the destruction of 
information in the adversary information infrastructure but also for the control 
interception”  (Azarov and Dodonov, 2006). 
For further description, Azarov and Dodonov note that the Department of 
Defense has defined an information system as, “the entire infrastructure, 
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organization, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, 
display, disseminate, and act on information.”  More recently, Joint Publication 1-
02 defines this term as ‘the organized collection, processing, transmission, and 
dissemination of information, in accordance with defined procedures, whether 
automated or manual” (Azarov and Dodonov, 2006). 
 To summarize the initial description of a cyber-attack in more conventional 
terms, a cyber-attack is an attempt to acquire control or govern information 
systems.  These information systems act upon information in such a manner as 
to make it accessible, such as with power grids and other end products of that 
information.  To control or govern the information not only affects the security of 
the information, but what can be accomplished with that information.  Systems 
that could come under cyber-attack include electrical and telecommunications 
infrastructure or automatons, traffic and air control systems, nuclear power, 
defense systems, private information systems, and so on. 
 Cyber-attacks are capable of a wide range of ends.  At times, the 
endeavor is simply espionage, such as the Flame cyber-attack discovered in 2012 
in Iran, to be discussed later in Chapter Four.  At other times the goal is 
governing the accessibility to that information or controlling or disrupting entire 
systems as in Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008.  Other invasions may look to 
undermine information in an effort to sabotage or even to perhaps destroy not 
only information, but the application of information manifested in physical, “real-
world” systems.  The Stuxnet infiltration in 2010 was an example of a cyber-
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attack that destroyed physical assets in Iran used to enrich Uranium, tied directly 
to the nuclear facility at Natanz.  This example will also be analyzed in Chapter 
Four. 
 
Types of Cyber-Attack 
Many types of cyber-attack are at the disposal of the cyber-warrior.  
Therefore, a valuable effort in the analysis of cyberwar should include a general 
account of the options available in their arsenal.  A brief description of notable 
forms of cyber-attack follows to grant the reader a foundation for further 
exploration of the matter.   
Botnets. The botnet form of cyber-attack comes from the comingling of 
the term, “robot network”. A botnet is defined as, “[a] network of Internet-
connected end-user computing devices infected with bot malware, which are 
remotely controlled by third parties for nefarious purposes. A botnet is under the 
control of a given "botherder" or "botmaster." A botnet might have just a handful 
of botted hosts, or millions” (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2012).  
Botnets can be used in a large-scale operation in the sense that an attacking 
entity can conscript a multitude of computers without the typical user having any 
knowledge of their computer’s supplementary cause or even of its subversion.  
Botnets can use their unwitting mediums to supervise the dissemination of 
Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS), which I will cover shortly, acquire 
sensitive information from those participating computers as well as multiply itself 
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amongst other unprotected computers.  During the cyber-attack that afflicted the 
nation of Georgia in 2008 (described in the next chapter), botnets were used to 
bolster the scope of the Distributed Denial of Service attacks which crippled 
government websites and other information outlets.  
 Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks refer to, “[t]he prevention of authorized 
access to resources or the delaying of time-critical operations” (U.S. Department 
of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004).  By using 
up all the resources available for the network, system or applications in question, 
the attacker can limit or even prohibit the usage of the above, effectively 
bringing operations to a standstill until resolved.  Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks are simply DoS attacks, but on a grand scale with the usage of 
botnets or worms (which will also be discussed shortly).  DDoS is the preferred 
vehicle among attackers because of its sheer scope which allows for the 
opportunity to bring down an entire network or website by flooding the target 
system with an overwhelming amount of incoming network traffic (IT Law Wiki, 
2012).  
 In addition, although the attack can be traced to a multitude of sources 
across many countries, most are unwitting agents who are unaware that they are 
involved.  This allows for plausible deniability.  An applicable example of use of 
DoS or DDoS is the Denial of Service attack brought down Kyrgyzstan’s main 
internet servers and email capability on January 18, 2009.  Coincidentally, this 
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occurred the same day as Russian public pressure on Kyrgyzstan to stop U.S. use 
of an airbase, located at Bishkek (Ashmore, 2009).  The DDoS was traced back 
to Russia, but this does not necessarily mean that this is Russian interference. 
   Logic Bombs.  Logic Bombs are, “…in programming, a form of sabotage 
in which a programmer inserts code that causes the program to perform a 
destructive action when some triggering event occurs…”  (U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 2004).  If an event occurs which prompts the malicious 
computer code to commence, the immediate results are realized in the form of 
data being compromised.  Usually, a Logic Bomb is used to destroy data or at 
least render the data meaningless or unusable.  An attacker wanting to “cover 
his tracks’ could use a Logic Bomb to undermine the implicating data elements 
through this scrambling or destruction of the evidence.  Logic Bombs can 
sometimes even be used to render hardware inoperable thereby compromising 
the attached elements of a system.  On a small scale, this type of attack could be 
used by a disgruntled employee to erase data used on company servers.  In a 
more relevant example, China could implant Logic Bombs on the military 
informational infrastructure used by the United States, which would cripple 
American capabilities militarily during a conflict (Clarke and Knake, 2010).   
Trojan Horses.  A relative of the Logic Bomb, the Trojan horse cyber-
attack is a, “computer program that conceals harmful code.  A Trojan horse 
usually masquerades as a useful program that a user would wish to execute” 
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004).  Once the Trojan has been executed, its 
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ulterior motive is revealed, which was built by the attacker.  Indeed, in the realm 
of cyber-attack it is equivalent to self-sabotage.  Many times, Trojan horses are 
opportunities for attackers to gain “back door” access not previously available to 
a system via an authorized user.    
Using the previous example of Chinese asymmetrical warfare using cyber-
attacks can explain the use of a Trojan. Modernizing a network with greater 
safeguards, such as the use of a more robust Intrusion Detection and Protection 
System (IDPS) is common for security experts to block incoming attacks.  
However, if a Trojan were to get onto the system prior to the installation of an 
IPS, it may appear as an authorized entry.  Thus, a back door has been planted; 
an access point where infiltrators may plant such things as Logic Bombs, 
circumventing the protections is now in place. 
 Viruses.  Viruses are similar to Trojan horses in their malicious intent, but 
are actually applications themselves.  In addition, viruses can propagate with 
inadvertent (or advertent) human action, such as opening emails that include the 
virus or sharing infected files.  To elaborate, a virus is “a program that ‘infects’ 
computer files, usually executable programs, by inserting a copy of itself into the 
file. These copies are usually executed when the ‘infected’ file is loaded into 
memory, allowing the virus to infect other files” (U.S. General Accounting Office, 
2004). 
 The application of viruses can range anywhere from simple day-to-day 
computer operations (the ILOVEYOU virus in 2000), to the use on nation-states.  
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They can also range in their intentions from destruction to espionage.  The 
“Flame” virus that will be analyzed later was used as an espionage tool in Iran.  
Inadvertent usage of infected files allowed the virus to spread, allowing for the 
designers of the virus access to information located on Iranian networks as well 
as the networks themselves.   
 Worms.  Worms denote an, “independent computer program that 
reproduces by copying itself from one system to another across a network” (U.S. 
General Accounting Office, 2004).  The main difference between worms and 
viruses are worms’ capability to self-propagate.  Generally, worms are used to 
drain resources on network systems, create “back door” accessibility, perform 
DDoS attacks, and other various aims.  While the self-propagation capability 
sounds ominous, this is indeed limited to network connectivity.  Therefore, 
localization through disconnection from any network concentrates the worm to a 
location, unable to spread.   
 Containment is attainable, but if a worm is not known to exist, it is free to 
propagate at will.  The example of “Stuxnet” (noted later) is a very appropriate 
explanation of what a worm is capable of.  The use of Stuxnet spread beyond its 
intended scope by its designers.  However, its initial use was to establish control 
within a system, allowing a different set of parameters to be followed based on 
what the worm designers had established.  Once the worm had spread beyond 
its initial scope, the requirements imbedded in the worm code were not met, and 
therefore, the control interception beyond the initial scope was rendered largely 
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harmless.   
 
Examples of Cyber-Attack Usage  
Cyber-attacks made up of the preceding methods are capable of a wide-
range of control.  Clarke and Knake utilize clever anecdotes to grant the reader 
an example of what such control can achieve.  Details are sketchy on exactly 
what kinds of cyber-attacks were used and when these events occurred, but that 
does not lessen their practical importance, particularly given that the examples 
come from the former Special Advisor on Cyber-security under President George 
W. Bush (Clarke and Knake, 2010). 
Looking back at the Second War in Iraq, Clarke and Knake describe the 
situation in Iraq prior to the conventional attack, where the United States had 
infiltrated the supposedly “closed-loop” military network.  A “closed loop” 
network refers to a network that operates disconnected from outside influences 
could invade the information system.     
Many Iraqi military officers had received emails of the sort that advised 
them of a course of action (most notably, do not participate and you will be 
reconstituted once the regime has been replaced).  The emails intimated that 
these actions that would supposedly save them from the impending American 
onslaught (Clarke and Knake, 2010).  The authors can speculate on what was 
actually in the emails, but the tool of information in the cyber-warrior’s hands 
and the opportunity to disseminate that information as one chooses can be a 
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powerful combination to face.   
Another example Clarke and Knake cite is the event where Israel had 
“owned” the air-defense network of Syria, and attacked one of their nuclear 
facilities.  In essence, the Israelis utilized a pseudo-cloaking device, replacing the 
air defense signals that Syria should have noticed (incoming Israeli planes), with 
a signal of silence (meant to signify peaceful skies to the observers) (Clarke and 
Knake, 2010).  Through the undermining of the air defense information system 
Syria could have used to monitor their airspace and protect their closely guarded 
nuclear facility, Israel was able to violate Syrian airspace, and knock out what 
Israel perceived to be a potential threat.   
A military incursion of another nation’s air space could be construed as a 
violation of the sovereignty of that state, and a pretext to war.  However, without 
evidence to support the assertion of an invasion on the part of Israel, save for 
perhaps obvious motives, denial on the part of Israel is all that would be needed 
to avert a local or regional crisis.  After all, the intrusion was not even caught by 
Syria’s first-alert air defense systems, and could have been interpreted as an 
accident at the site itself.  Other reasons for Syria’s silence on the matter may 
also exist, but without evidence, confirmation of the identity of Israeli military 
craft in Syrian airspace was unavailable. 
These scenarios are not the product of an overactive imagination.  These 
are real-world applications of where the commandeering of a nation’s information 
system, in these cases military and defense related, and the scope of such 
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intrusion is not left to simply military application.  Civilian entities are also 
potential targets of cyber-attack, such as the informational or resource 
infrastructure within a state.  Infiltration of a networked power grid could cripple 
a state financially and logistically if sabotage of the system were to be controlled, 
or worse, brought down.  Schmitt states, “…because of the potentially grave 
impact of CNA on a state’s infrastructure, it can prove a high gain, low risk option 
for a state outclassed militarily or economically (Schmitt, 1999).   It is therefore 
important to analyze historical examples of such cyber-attacks on nations.     
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Chapter Four: 
Case Studies 
With the relative youth of the practice of cyberwar, case studies are 
difficult to establish.  The lack of concrete examples in which nations have 
participated in cyber-attacks on another nation exacerbates this task.  This 
difficulty is augmented by the challenge of attributing cyber-attacks to a 
particular state.  Inevitably, hacking agents and “cyber-warriors” utilize various 
tools to mask their identities as well as insulate themselves from their sponsors.  
Attempts to link the origination of cyber-attacks to the main force behind the 
attack are sometimes an almost insurmountable job.  However, some incidents 
have been noted that have directly affected state operations.  With a basic 
understanding of what cyber-attacks are available in the cyber-warrior’s arsenal, 
we can examine cases that better help us understand what occurred.   
These case studies are described in order to better equip the reader with 
a sense of the practical importance of cyberwar against states.  I analyze recent 
cyber-attacks on states, all within the last five years.  In these cases, I look for 
suspicion of state involvement in the attack, and if that suspicion became more 
substantial based on findings.  In essence, these examples were chosen for 
analysis because of their potential for implicating nation-states.  I also look to 
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understand the intended effects of the cyber-attack, and who or what those 
effects were meant to target.   
As mentioned previously, the following case studies will be covered briefly:  
the Estonian Cyber-Attack of 2007 and the Georgian Cyber-Attack of 2008 during 
their conflict with Russia.  Also, the Stuxnet worm of 2009 and the Flame virus 
that was uncovered in 2012 involving Iran and its nuclear centrifuges at the 
Natanz complex will merit attention.   
 
Estonian Cyber-Attack of 2007 
 The cyber-attack that afflicted the tiny nation of Estonia in 2007 is widely 
regarded as the world’s first cyber-attack that left the national security of a state 
in the balance (Beidleman, 2011).  According to Beidleman, “botnets…seized 
more than a million computers from 75 countries and directed them to barrage 
targets in Estonia” (Beidleman, 2011).  The botnets utilized distributed denial of 
service attacks to flood information requests onto websites associated with the 
government, the banking sector and other important essentials of Estonian life.  
Such devastating information overload delivered by the distributed denial of 
service attacks crippled all Estonian informational infrastructure elements that 
were associated with everyday use of internet.  Automated Teller Machines 
(ATMs) no longer dispensed currency.  Vandalism of websites also occurred.  The 
news media was incapable of offering citizens any updates.   
 Ashmore notes that the Estonians were able to respond effectively, limiting 
37 
 
the effects to short-term outages.  Further, there were no permanent damages 
inflicted to the informational infrastructure (Ashmore, 2009).  Estonia 
successfully employed its Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and 
comingled efforts between government and civilian experts mitigated the 
potential for disaster.  Alexander Ntok, head of Corporate Strategy at the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) lauds the Estonian responses and 
recovery efforts: “it was imaginative responses that allowed Estonia to emerge 
from the spring cyber-attack relatively unscathed” (as cited in Ashmore, 2009).  
In fact, Ashmore finds Estonia in a leadership role as it pertains to NATO 
Information Technology structural defense.  Estonia has also provided expert 
personnel to staff the NATO Cyber Defence Centre in Tallinn upon its opening in 
May 2008 (as cited in Ashmore, 2009).   
 Estonia also has looked to bolster the international legal agenda to 
enhance laws to protect Information Technology infrastructures.  According to 
the Estonian Ministry of Defense, Estonia has worked to increase international 
cooperation to protect global systems (as cited in Ashmore, 2009).  In addition, 
during Estonia’s response to the attack, the CERT for Estonia issued an 
international appeal for assistance among specialists and firms from around the 
world (Jenik, 2009). 
 While Estonia’s response to an otherwise ground-breaking problem in 
state security has been extoled, the questions arise: why was the response 
necessary and who was answerable to the breach?   
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 Many have speculated that because of the identification of Russian 
internet protocol (IP) addresses used in the attack, the culpability lies with 
Russia.  Further, tensions at that time between ethnic Russians living in Estonia 
and the nation itself were peaking due to Estonian aims to move a statue in 
place to celebrate Soviet casualties during World War II. Russians have 
celebrated victory in World War II on May 9, and according to the Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State for the Estonian Ministry of Defence, Lauri Almann, 
“The idea was to have a huge gathering on 9 May that was combined with a 
huge cyber-attack” (Mansfield-Devine, 2012).  Paramilitary groups, such as the 
Russian Business Network have been found to be involved in the cyber-attack (as 
well as in the Georgian cyber-attack in 2008).  Gervais finds that, “the 
relationship between the Russian Business Network and the Russian State should 
be sufficient to impute state responsibility” (Gervais, 2012).  In addition, the 
Russian government offered no cooperation in tracking down the botnets and 
their origination and Estonian requests for bilateral investigation under the 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) were denied by Russia (Shackelford, 
2009). 
 Even with the smoking gun and a potential motive available, the extent of 
Russian guilt in this instance has not been ascertained. However, other cyber-
attacks in former Soviet satellites have occurred in Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan and 
Georgia (to be discussed shortly).  In these cases, allegations of Russian 
involvement have been voluble (Ashmore, 2009). 
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Georgian Cyber-Attack of 2008 
 Georgia was also a nation subjected to the aims of a cyber-attack.  
However, different from the Estonian example, this attack coincided with the 
Russian invasion of South Ossetia in August of 2008.  According to Milikishvili, 
this was the first time that a cyber-attack accompanied armed conflict (as cited 
in Ashmore, 2009).  A denial of service attack claimed the website of the 
Georgian president as well as other government sites (Ashmore, 2009).  
Defacement of websites (including adding images of Adolf Hitler to web pages 
associated with the Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili) also occurred (as 
cited in Ashmore, 2009).     
 In the case of Georgia’s informational infrastructure, its international 
connectivity was far more limited than Estonia’s.  Also, most international 
connectivity that was available was through Russian territory (Stapleton-Gray and 
Woodcock, 2011).  Therefore, attempts to block outgoing messages including 
media reports were easier.  Compared to Estonia’s heavy reliance on Information 
Technology infrastructure and e-commerce, Georgia was not nearly as engaged.   
 Stapleton-Gray and Woodcock mention an interesting occurrence of 
outside entities “mirroring” Georgian web content in lieu of the cyber-attack.  
This mirroring is symbolic of external support from governments (Poland, e.g.) 
and corporations (Google, e.g.) sympathetic to the state’s duress (Stapleton-Gray 
and Woodcock, 2011, Ashmore, 2009).   Estonia sent Information Technology 
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security specialists from its own CERT to assist in combating the cyber-attacks 
(Ashmore, 2009). 
  As with Estonia, there was no direct linkage between Russian government 
involvement and the cyber-attacks.  However, the cyber-attacks in Georgia and 
Estonia, (as well as other attacks in Kyrgyzstan and Lithuania not analyzed here) 
were initiated in response to hostility with Russia (as cited in Ashmore, 2009).  
Whether there was some level of Russian involvement or not, Ashmore asserts, 
“opposition to the Russian government could result in a cyber-attack which could 
disrupt critical government infrastructure” (Ashmore, 2009).  It is important to 
note Shackelford’s assertion, “states remain the focus of containing IW 
(information warfare) as the Estonia incident and the Russian-Georgian armed 
conflict reveal more and more of a cyber dimension to international conflicts 
(Shackelford, 2009).  If this trend continues, as many believe it will, the 
implications of cyber-attacks among states will require closer examination. 
 
Stuxnet 
 Shifting geographically from Eastern Europe to the Middle East we find 
more evidence of cyber-warfare among states, although the evidence was not 
nearly as clear initially.  A worm, popularly known as “Stuxnet,” had infiltrated 
the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz.  Stuxnet has been found to have infected 
over 60,000 computers, half of which were located in the Iranian state (Farwell 
and Rohozinski, 2011).  While that leaves other infections outside Iran, including 
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India, China, the United States and Australia among others, Ralph Langner calls 
Stuxnet, “an all-out cyber strike against the Iranian nuclear program” (Langner, 
2010).   
 Stuxnet was a worm designed to infiltrate and establish control, as well as 
change instructions in remote systems (Farwell and Rohozinski, 2011).  A “zero-
day attack,” Stuxnet used a penetration technique never before seen, aiming to 
exploit a previously unknown weakness in software (Clarke and Knake, 2010).  
In fact, the authors Clarke and Knake claim that the cyber-attack was made up 
of four zero-day attack techniques, ostensibly in the event that a technique was 
ineffective, it could try the next.   
 The challenge for the Stuxnet worm was that according to Farwell and 
Rohozinski, the worm’s target was actually not connected to any public 
infrastructure.  Therefore, the infection would require the use of an external 
device, such as a USB memory stick.  Upon infection, Stuxnet used Siemens’ 
default passwords to find and acquire access to particular programs, called 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) (McMillan, 2010).  The PLCs at Natanz 
were made by an Iranian company called Fararo Paya (Clarke and Knake, 2010).  
This fact has important ramifications to be discussed later.   
 Also important are SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) 
systems.  They are used to control large-scale industrial systems in factories, 
power plants, military installations and others (McMillan, 2010). To simplify, the 
SCADA system tells the machinery what to do and monitors its work.  Stuxnet 
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not only gained access, but it reprogrammed the SCADA systems.  It then began 
to manipulate the cycle drive speeds within gas centrifuges at Natanz, resulting 
in rotor damage and in effect rendering the centrifuge useless (Langner, 2010).  
Clarke and Knake claim that almost 1,000 centrifuges at the Natanz site were 
removed as a result of the sabotage. 
 As mentioned earlier, the worm had spread beyond Iran, into other 
nations.  This was not by design.  The worm was designed to search for Siemens 
software running Fararo Paya PLCs (Clarke and Knake, 2010).  However, the 
worm continued to look outside of this scope, for the Siemens software.  If it did 
not locate the software and PLC recipe, it continued on, infecting other networks 
but remaining dormant.  As a result, the worm was now out in the open, 
available for cyber-warriors and hackers around the world to analyze and break 
down its complex code. Since it was never meant to get into the open, it truly 
highlights the dangers of cyber operations.   
 Who would be potentially responsible for this cyber-attack? Clarke and 
Knake note, “In June 2009, four Iranian organizations were infected.  None of 
the four were publicly known to be connected to Natanz, but the CIA or Mossad 
knew they were” (Clarke and Knake, 2010).  This infers American and Israeli 
coordination, if not direct action.  Kaspersky Lab researcher Roel Schouwenberg 
agrees that this cyber-attack was most likely the work of a nation-state 
(McMillan, 2010).  Sanger claims that President Barack Obama looked to 
accelerate former President G.W. Bush’s aims to expand the United States’ use of 
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cyber-weapons (Sanger, 2012).  Sanger reports that interviews with current and 
former American, European and Israeli officials involved confirmed American and 
Israeli involvement.  Allegations of American involvement in another cyber-attack 
in the Middle East will be covered in the next section on “Flame”.  Langner notes 
that the attack was very sophisticated, requiring perhaps several years of 
preparation.  This level of complexity was not believed possible at the time, 
indicating professional handling. Considering the chilling alternative, Langner 
states, “let’s just HOPE the US is the leading force behind Stuxnet” (Langner, 
2010).  What Langner implies, is that if this level of complexity was not 
generated by the United States, the alternative could be another nation-state, or 
possibly a private hacking entity.  
 
Flame 
 The previous case studies have alluded to cyber-attack potential for 
control, disruption and destruction.  However, these need not be the only 
capabilities for hacking into state resources.  It might befit a nation-state to 
utilize cyber resources in ways that human intelligence may be unrealistic or 
unprofitable.  A great example of this scenario would be the computer virus now 
known as “Flame.” 
 Flame was not designed to be destructive.  Rather, its primary function 
was espionage.  Also known as Flamer and Skywiper, the primary infection was 
deemed to be in Iran, though other Middle East nations reported infection.  Later, 
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infections spread among other nations.  Experts believe the possibility exists that 
travelers may have taken laptops abroad with the infection (Constantin, 2012).  
The computers affected belonged to individuals, as well as educational 
institutions and state-related organizations (Nakashima, 2012). 
 Compared to Stuxnet, researchers have deemed Flame to be related, 
though approximately twenty times the size of Stuxnet (Nakashima, 2012) and 
much more complex (Constantin, 2012).  Written in a computer language called 
LUA due to its stability (which is uncommon for most malware attacks), Flame 
was designed to be hard to detect (Tsukayama, 2012).  This insinuates that the 
designers wished it to remain in an espionage capacity.  Indeed, the infection 
was only found two years after initial activation, after Iran’s Oil Ministry 
discovered disruptions and investigated (Nakashima, Miller and Tate, 2012). 
 Schouwenberg notes that this is the first virus capable of using, 
“Bluetooth wireless technology to send and receive commands and data” (as 
cited in Nakashima, 2012). However, the primary method of infection was 
copying itself to portable USB devices and through printer vulnerabilities 
(Constantin, 2012).  CrySys, a cryptography and security lab, claims that Flame 
was capable of, “logging keystrokes, activating microphones to record 
conversations and taking screenshots” (Nakashima, 2012).  Alexander Gostev 
says, “Flame can easily be described as one of the most complex threats ever 
discovered” (Gostev, 2012).   
 Researchers later found that Flame had also exploited Microsoft Windows 
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Update on machines with Windows Operating Systems.  The writers of Flame 
had somehow stolen digital signatures of code which allowed the malicious code 
to masquerade as code “approved by Microsoft.”  This means that the fully-
patched machines were infected by supposedly legitimate code.  This prompted 
Microsoft to issue an immediate fix just days after the initial reports of the cyber-
attack, rather than wait for the designated patch date (Keizer, 2012).   
 Initially, attribution was again challenging.  Gostev offers the following 
analysis:  “there are three known classes of players who develop malware and 
spyware:  hacktivists, cybercriminals and nation-states” (Gostev, 2012).  Given 
the complexity, hacktivism is not the likely source.  Further, the intention of 
Flame was not to steal money from bank accounts, mitigating the possibility of 
cybercriminal activity (Gostev, 2012).  Finally, this complexity in addition to the 
geographic focus of the attack (Iran, but also including Palestinian areas of 
Israel, Sudan, Syria, among others) leaves the ostensible conclusion that Flame 
was a tool used by nation-state(s) (Gostev, 2012).  
 Indeed, Kaspersky labs later surmised that specific computer code was 
used in both Flame as well as the aforementioned Stuxnet.  Gostev claims, 
“…conclusions point to the existence of two independent developer teams…” 
though, “part of the code from the Flame platform was used in Stuxnet” (Gostev, 
2012). The findings indicate that while two teams may have been independent, 
some collaboration existed. 
 The Washington Post confirmed that the United States and Israel, 
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“…jointly developed a sophisticated computer virus nicknamed Flame” 
(Nakashima, Miller and Tate, 2012).  Further, “the massive piece of malware 
secretly mapped and monitored Iran’s computer networks, sending back a steady 
stream of intelligence to prepare for a cyber-warfare campaign” (Nakashima, 
Miller and Tate, 2012).  Based on this finding, it is reasonable to assume that 
Flame actually predated Stuxnet.  According to Schouwenberg, Flame allowed for 
Stuxnet to sabotage Natanz based on Flame’s findings regarding networks 
associated with the nuclear facilities (Nakashima, Miller and Tate, 2012).  What 
began as an espionage operation led to an intricate first-strike on Iranian nuclear 
capability. 
 
Evaluation of Cases 
 The cases highlight some basic aims of cyber-attacks:  control, disruption, 
destruction and espionage.  All of the cases implicated nation-states, but it is 
important to note that none of the cases were definitive in attributing the cyber-
attack to the suspected nation-state.  Both the Estonian and Georgian cases 
include suspected Russian involvement or at least Russian support.  In both 
cases where Iran was the target of cyber-attacks, suspicion falls on the United 
States and Israel, with some media “insiders” alleging confirmation of the states’ 
involvement.  While some government officials and media point fingers, the 
instigators of the cyber-attacks remain unidentified.  This finding has 
repercussions for the question of attribution of cyber-attacks to be analyzed later 
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in Chapter Five. 
 The other important issue evaluated in these cases was the question of 
intended effects, as well as which entity or entities were to be affected.  In both 
the Estonian and Georgian cases, informational infrastructure was targeted.  This 
left not only government but civilian entities in a debilitated state for long periods 
of time.  In addition, the Georgian cyber-attack was accompanied by a military 
incursion into Georgian territory, raising suspicions that the two operations were 
related.  The Iranian cyber-attacks were both directed towards facilities 
suspected of uranium enrichment; the end result of which may or may not have 
been for military purposes.  The issues surrounding these cases raise questions 
of targeting combatants vs. non-combatants as well as directing attacks against 
dual-use entities, which I also assess in Chapter Five.   
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Chapter Five: 
International Law and Its Applications to Cyberwar upon Nation-states  
 The dangers of cyberwar among states go beyond the daily inconvenience 
that the common individual experiences every day.  Viruses, worms and the like 
have become so commonplace among computer users that most of the 
population is aware of the dangers.  Most individuals have taken reasonable 
measures to defend their property and capital from outside attack.  Informed 
users know that malware protection is available, and it is up to them to keep 
their protection updated to keep up with the latest infections.  Malware 
protection software companies are also hard at work to keep up with the 
constant barrage of new malware as best as they can.  Even with such effort, 
there are challenges.  The common individual does not have much of a say in the 
national defenses of states.  States must continue to protect their infrastructures 
as well as communicate with fellow states within the international community.  
Otherwise, domestic safeguards noted above are largely inadequate.  States 
have a duty to protect and assist not only their own citizens but civilians 
everywhere.  International norms and agreements must exist that unequivocally 
define cyber-attacks, related terms and the behaviors among states that are to 
become customary in a cyber world.  I argue these norms should go beyond the 
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current application of jus in bello and include international law governing 
cyberwar. 
 
Comparison to Nuclear Weapons 
 Authors Damrosh, Henkin, Murphy and Smit describe international law as, 
“concerned with law that principally operates among sovereign countries (or 
‘states’), arising from sources such as treaties and the customary practice of 
states” (Damrosch, Henkin, Murphy and Smit, 2009).  The authors note that, 
“traditionally, international law was seen as the law of the international 
community of states, the basic units in the world political system from the Peace 
of Westphalia (1648) forward” (Ibid, 2009).  However, an important change 
occurred following the First World War.  Malanczuk calls this “modern” 
international law, concerning itself with an, “attempt to organize the international 
community and to ban the use of force” (Malanczuk, 1997).   
 This ban on the use of force is found in Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter.   As a caveat, Article 51 provides for the right of states to collective and 
individual self-defense against armed attacks (United Nations, 1945).  The UN 
Charter does not offer any guidance on the topic of cyberwar, however.  This 
makes sense, since the original UN Charter was created in 1945, well before this 
issue came about.  Swanson definitively declares, “Currently, there is no 
provision in international humanitarian law (IHL) or customary international law 
(CIL) that explicitly outlaws cyber-warfare or computer network attacks, either 
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carried out independently or during times of war (Swanson, 2010).  However, 
Swanson finds that international law has been capable of addressing warfare and 
its changing dynamics and capabilities.  “The Geneva Conventions, as well as the 
international humanitarian law principles of proportionality and unnecessary 
suffering, all provide a legal framework for addressing cyber-warfare issues 
(Swanson, 2010).   
 It could be argued that cyber-weapons are similar to nuclear weapons.  
Their unique capabilities and characteristics call for unique laws (Swanson, 
2010).  Shackelford points out that the cyber-attacks on Estonia, “like nuclear 
warfare, do not discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, nor do 
they pass the test of proportionality” (Shackelford, 2009).  The International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled the threat or use of nuclear weapons, “would 
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law” (I.C.J., 
1996).  The potential for disastrous consequences in a nuclear attack can be 
matched in the case of an all-out attack using cyber-warfare.  The example of a 
cyber-attack where critical infrastructures are destroyed or otherwise rendered 
useless can leave a state in a helpless position, causing unnecessary suffering to 
its citizens.  If nuclear weapon use is subject to the rules of international 
humanitarian law, so too should cyber-attacks (Shackelford, 2009).   
 Nuclear capability among major powers redefined the context of warfare 
during the twentieth century.  Once the world observed what nuclear weapons 
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were capable of, it became evident that this technology was not to be taken 
lightly.  I would argue the same could be said for the use of cyberwar continuing 
in the twenty-first century.  Except in this case, nuclear weapons are not as 
readily available to the general population, whereas hacking capabilities can be 
learned by anyone with the desire and talent.  Furthermore, the world has not 
yet seen the overwhelming potential of cyberwar on a grand scale, and therefore 
this may not be taken as seriously unless a catastrophic cyberwar-like event were 
to occur. 
 
Shortcomings of Conventional Jus In Bello Application to Cyberwar 
 The Geneva Conventions place limits on conduct among war participants.  
Jus in bello, the law of war, stipulate restraints placed on the extent of harm to 
non-combatants.  Non-combatants have not forfeited the same rights that 
soldiers have by entering military service.  Distinction between civilians (and 
civilian entities) and combatants (and their entities) must exist.  Therefore, 
military objectives should be the primary targets for an attack (U.N.T.S. Protocol 
additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Additional Protocol I, 
2009).   
 Protections afforded to civilians also encompass any objects that are 
indispensable to the civilian population.  However, Hollis explains a challenge 
inherent within cyberwar: “The irony of information operations (IO) is that the 
less likely it is that a particular IO functions as an attack, the more likely it is that 
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its use against civilians and their objects is permissible.  In other words, IO’s 
development may actually result in warfare having more impact on civilians by 
expanding militaries’ ability to target (but not attack) them” (Hollis, 2007).  
During conflict, any force must be met with a proportionate response.  For 
example, an attack by Nation A at a military base in Nation B does not in and of 
itself grant license to Nation B to use a cyber-attack to shut down an entire 
portion of the national electrical infrastructure in Nation A.  Such an escalated 
response would inevitably affect multiple sectors, public and private, reliant on 
electrical systems, including economic sectors, health sectors and public safety.  
That violates not only the proportional aspect of current jus in bello, as well as 
the non-combatant protections afforded by the Geneva Conventions.   
 Indeed, another aspect of the law of war allows for the military targeting 
of “dual-use” entities.  For example, civilians working at a military munitions 
factory are seen to be in a “dual-use” capacity.  As such, this facility would 
qualify for military targeting.  This possibility exists for virtually all computer 
networks.  Hollis notes that as of 2000, 95% of U.S. military traffic went through 
civilian telecommunication and computer systems (Hollis, 2007).  Under the 
“dual-use” rule, any adversary could potentially attack any communication 
system (if they are to be treated as military objectives), and they may be 
targeted either using cyber-warfare OR conventional means.  Attempts to 
interfere with military or government communications via the informational 
infrastructure would also interfere with civilian use of the same infrastructure.  
53 
 
Indeed, Schaap argues, “Cyber-warfare operations…create more opportunities 
for targeting dual-use objects” (Schaap, 2009). 
 While the attempts to endorse a law of war have thus far been well-
intended, it is clear that the usage of jus in bello to adequately cover the 
complex intricacies of cyberwar is simplistic and naïve.  Complications arise from 
cyberwar and its humanitarian effects on the non-combatants of the targeted 
state.  This issue raises difficult questions, and does not even begin to satisfy 
concerns regarding asymmetric uses of cyberwar between state and non-state 
actors or including non-international areas and territories.  In short, current 
international law is insufficient to address all complexities and circumstances 
through which cyberwar may occur (Hollis, 2007). 
 
The Challenge of Attribution 
 Shackelford claims that attribution of a cyber-attack to a state is the key 
element in building a functioning international regime (Shackelford, 2010).  While 
some instances of government sponsored cyber-attack using transnational 
networks can be traced to a nation-state, more typically these attacks are not 
from official state action.   
 Two international standards exist that could offer guidance on the issue of 
attribution.  First, the doctrine of effective control establishes the understanding 
of a state’s control over paramilitary groups and other non-state actors if the 
actors act in “complete dependence” on that state (as cited in Shackelford, 
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2010).  Conversely, the operational control doctrine, found that where the state 
has a role in coordinating on behalf of a particular group and offering support, 
there is enough overall control to attribute a group’s actions to the supporting 
state (as cited in Shackelford, 2010). 
 While the International Court of Justice has more often utilized the first 
and more constricting interpretation, the doctrine of effective control, this may 
not be feasible in the present context of cyber-attack.  Nations may easily hide 
behind the doctrine of effective control because of the challenges of attributing 
cyber-attacks to any nation-state.  Complete government control will be difficult 
to establish in many cases.  However, if the second, more liberal doctrine of 
operational control is used as the interpretation of cyber-attacks and their 
attribution, any nation that simply coordinated and supported an attack would be 
attributed.  Using the Estonian case noted previously, the doctrine of operational 
control interpretation would surely find Russian involvement to be adequate to 
grant Estonia reparations (Shackelford, 2010).   
 The need for clarity on the question of attribution is of great importance, 
as it may take many years of practice for customary international law to become 
crystalized.  However, even with a firmer establishment of attributive law, this 
does not rectify the overall issue.  Today’s sophisticated techniques allow for the 
hacker to remain anonymous if they have the skillset.  Worse, they may implicate 
an otherwise innocent entity or nation-state.  “If a cyber-attack disabled critical 
infrastructure, or killed enough people, the United States could treat it as an act 
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of war—and respond with force by invoking the right of self-defense—without 
knowing for sure who launched the attack” (Hollis, 2011).  Therefore, the most 
hardened of efforts to attribute cyber-attacks to any one perpetrator or 
perpetrators may end without success, or worse the false-positivity of success.  
 
Future of Cyberwar Under Norms of Potential International Agreement 
 A future framework of norms that govern cyberwar must offer adequate 
guidance to what is arguably one of the most complex, misunderstood and 
potentially devastating issues the world faces today.  This challenge to 
international security and peace is occurring at the present, and unfortunately 
the international community is just starting to grasp what the issue entails.  In 
the fast-paced cyber-world, being reactive leaves one behind and vulnerable.  A 
proactive approach is needed on cyberwar to allow nation-states and their 
domestic and international entities the opportunity to mitigate the potential 
threats that are intrinsic within the growing cyber-world.  Clear delineations of 
norms must come to fruition, or risk confusion and potential chaos among states 
in responses to cyber-attack. 
 The complexities and pitfalls of cyberwar call for new international 
agreements on the matter.  The current regimes that govern warfare will not 
suffice.  The law of war was put in place to add a humanitarian element to 
warfare, but in cyberwar, the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants is not as discernible.  Non-combatants and the infrastructures that 
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they use on a daily basis must be protected to avoid modern catastrophe.    
 Regional cooperatives have been created, such as the NATO Cyber 
Defence Centre in Tallinn.  The, “NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence (NATO CCD COE) was formally established on the 14th of May, 2008, 
in order to enhance NATO’s cyber defence capability.  Located in Tallinn, Estonia, 
the Centre is an international effort that currently includes Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, the Netherlands and 
USA as Sponsoring Nations”  (CCD DOE, 2012).  Their mission is, “to enhance 
the capability, cooperation and information sharing among NATO, NATO nations 
and partners in cyber defence by virtue of education, research and development, 
lessons learned and consultation” (CCD DOE, 2012).  The centre, located in 
Estonia, where the cyber-attacks of 2007 occurred, is a reminder of what can be 
accomplished as lessons are learned from difficult circumstances.  Unfortunately, 
it was these difficult circumstances that brought the issue to light.  The 
international society of states must come to consensus on this matter, before 
such disruption occurs.  After all, it may not be a nation behind such attacks. 
States wishing to protect themselves beyond their own cyber-protections 
domestically should also come together diplomatically on this critical issue.  
Perhaps an international regime similar to regional cooperatives such as the 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre may be in order.  “The fight against 
cyber-terrorism, computer hacking and economic cyber deception has to be rated 
as a common strategy for any national government in the Information Age and 
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requires consecutive coordinated interaction between groups of national 
governments” (Azarov and Dodonov, 2006). 
 Actions on the part of the international community during the Georgian 
conflict as well as during the Estonian cyber-attack seem to indicate that 
sympathetic nations are willing to help in times of crisis.   As noted previously, 
during the Estonian affair, a call for help from the Estonian CERT went out 
around the world.  During the Georgian crisis, sympathetic nations and 
corporations came to Georgian aid, placing important information onto the 
internet in lieu of the fact that Georgia was unable to do so.  In addition, during 
the cyber-attacks, Estonia had sent IT security specialists to aid in bringing 
Georgia back online.  While customary international law may take time to 
develop, there has been a historical basis for assisting ailing units during times of 
dire need.  In fact, there is international law already in place that requires 
assistance, if it has been reasonably requested by the party under duress and 
the ability to help exists.  The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
may hold some analogous application to cyberwar.   
 Duty To Assist.  Hollis points out the similarities between an SOS at sea 
and the characteristics of cyber-attacks:  “Strikingly, the three elements giving 
rise to the SOS at sea – incapacity, severity and urgency – characterize 
cyberthreats as well” (Hollis, 2011).  Challenging cyber-attacks can, “overwhelm 
the most sophisticated individuals, groups and even states” (Hollis, 2011).  As 
seen in Estonia and Georgia, the state became incapacitated under duress until 
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the situation came under control, and outside assistance surely had a hand in 
bringing the crises to their conclusion. 
 In terms of severity, Hollis argues that cyber-attacks have the potential for 
systemic concerns, rather than simply localized consequences.  While economic 
effects may occur, the entire system may become erratic due to the inherent 
entwined nature of many systems.  Aggregated effects are felt throughout the 
system, its users and potentially an entire nation.  Indeed, infrastructures that 
affect resource distribution, such as water and power systems can have real 
consequences for life, beyond merely systems and economic factors. 
 The question of urgency should be addressed without doubt.  Cyber 
threats can and do arise immediately.  Sometimes, dormant threats exist, such 
as logic bombs infused within informational infrastructures.  These potential 
crises are waiting for the “go ahead,” and therefore can become urgent issues. 
 A duty to assist (DTA) paradigm should be incorporated into any 
international regime governing the use of cyber-attacks.  The previous question 
of attribution becomes less prevalent under an international system where 
professionals come to the aid of those under duress.  If norms existed that 
elevated the need to mitigate harm, rather than attribute blame through a 
collectively agreed upon duty to assist, attackers may be deterred from 
attempting attacks in the first place.  This is particularly true if requests for 
assistance come to a state that must aid against their own attack.  The cyber-
attack on Estonia led them to request assistance from the Russian government to 
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cut off DDoS attacks coming from its territory.  In the case of the actual account, 
Russia said it was not responsible and remained unhelpful.  However, under the 
DTA norm, Russia may not have the option of doing nothing, and might be 
obligated by the international norm to assist.  Of course, states must agree 
which threats are to be covered, who can legally request assistance and expect 
it, who must provide the assistance and finally, what assistance must be granted 
(Hollis, 2011).   
 The agreement must include clearly defined protocols on this matter, but 
under the circumstances, nation-states have many reasons to agree on such an 
idea.  Hollis argues that the Internet has become indispensable.  A shared and 
vested interest in the Internet is realized, when one understands that everyone is 
at risk, but at the same time, everyone can help (Hollis, 2011).    Individuals, 
who learn that they are part of a botnet without realizing it, can disconnect from 
it.  In the cyber-world of extreme interconnectivity, every little effort helps, and 
many times with instant results.  Individual states can rely on their fellow states 
to assist, as in the future, the reverse may be true and the latter may need 
assistance from the former. 
 This whole area raises a pivotal question:  Should cyber-attacks be 
outlawed in all situations?  This universal ideal may be misguided, as states will 
want to continue their tactics of cyber-espionage, and perhaps even cyber-
warfare on military targets.  However, any international norms governing cyber-
attack must be clear in what cyber-attacks are allowed under some sort of cyber-
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jus in bello standard that can be negotiated by states.  Cyber threats that cause 
unnecessary human suffering must continue to be outlawed as seen from the 
perspective of international law.    
 While the international community may continue to operate under 
auspices of shared interests in many cases, there still is the understanding that 
international anarchy is still in place.  States are individuals in an international 
society with equal stature and equal resonance of opinion but there still is the 
expectation that states may indeed flout decrees if they see it in their best 
interest.  However, under a set of international norms that governs cyberwar, a 
nation that does not follow these norms would be a member that cannot be 
trusted, and may find themselves isolated.  Even so, I assert states will, in many 
cases identify common ground and should come to agreement on this 
international space known as the Internet, if it is in their best interest.  With 
most states using the same informational, interconnected infrastructure their 
best interests lie in perpetuating its safety, until something else comes along to 
replace the Internet.   Until then, everyone is in the same vulnerable situation. 
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Chapter Six: 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Beidleman calls cyberspace, “the world’s nervous system; the control 
system of modern society.  Its protection is an international existential concern” 
(Beidleman, 2011).  Such grand sentiment is echoed among users who have 
come to rely on cyberspace to function daily.  Today’s globalizing climate 
necessitates the use of cyberspace to communicate and grow.  The issue of 
cyberwar challenges future state and international security.  Cyberwar as we 
currently understand it has not had a very long existence, and yet its 
metamorphosis through technological advancement has brought remarkable 
strain to global proceedings. 
 After analyzing shortcomings of the realist and liberalist perspectives 
towards international norms concerning cyberwar, and looking at the issue 
through the lens of the English School perspective, I argue that this is not the 
time for unilateralism. Instead, I assert that international consensus on the 
question of cyberwar must come to fruition.  The English School perspective 
offers an environment where an international society of states can perpetuate 
regional and international cooperation in the face of dangers not understood until 
recently.  Customary international law may be too slow to respond to the fast-
paced cyber-world.  States must be proactive rather than reactive to the threats 
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inherent in cyberspace.  Those in the minority that believe that this issue does 
not command immediate attention need only speak with those who have 
experience in this arena.  This is not meant to be a metaphorical “the sky is 
falling” attitude, but to continue the metaphor, an umbrella would be handy, and 
everyone should have access to one.   
 The case studies that are included have shown that states (as well as 
capable individuals and other actors) can create an environment that leaves 
those affected incapacitated and damaged.  The potential for international 
consensus may be of comfort, but this consensus must be clear and address the 
multitude of complexities and dangers intrinsic to the issues of cyberwar.  I 
recommend that newly formed norms perhaps codified in treaties might offer the 
international community some clarity and agreement among its members.  
Similar to the nuclear threat faced by those in the twentieth century, a new 
regime of international law needs to be sanctioned and enacted in order to begin 
to regulate cyberwar in the twenty-first century and beyond.  To do less is to 
invite cyber-disaster. 
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Appendix A:  Glossary of Acronyms and Terms 
 
Botnet:  A network of Internet-connected end-user computing devices infected 
with bot malware, which are remotely controlled by third parties for nefarious 
purposes. A botnet is under the control of a given "botherder" or "botmaster." A 
botnet might have just a handful of botted hosts, or millions (U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission, 2012). 
 
Computer Network Attack (CNA): Actions taken through the use of 
computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in 
computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves 
(Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, 2012). 
 
Cyber-attack (CyA):  CyA actions combine Computer Network Attack (CNA) 
with other enabling capabilities (such as, EA, physical attack and others) to deny 
or manipulate information and/or infrastructure (U.S. Army TRADOC Pam 525-7-
8, 2010). 
 
Cyber-terrorism:  Premeditated, politically motivated attack against 
information, computer systems, computer programmes, and data, which result in 
violence against noncombatant targets (Azarov and Dodonov, 2006). 
 
Cyberspace:  A global domain within the information environment consisting of 
the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including 
the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded 
processors and controllers (Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, 2012). 
 
Cyberwar:  Actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers 
or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption (Clarke and Knake, 
2010). 
 
Defense Information Infrastructure (DII): The shared or interconnected 
system of computers, communications, data applications, security, people, 
training, and other support structures serving Department of Defense (DOD) 
local, national, and worldwide information needs.  The defense information 
infrastructure connects DOD mission support, command and control, and 
intelligence computers through voice, telecommunications, imagery, video, and 
multimedia services.  It provides information processing and services to 
subscribers over the Defense Information Systems Network and includes 
command and control, tactical, intelligence, and commercial communications 
systems used to transmit DOD information (Department of Defense Joint 
Publication 1-02, 2012). 
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Denial of Service Attack (DoS):  The prevention of authorized access to 
resources or the delaying of time-critical operations (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004).   
 
Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS): Same as Denial of Service 
attacks, but on a grand scale using Botnets or Worms to spread the attack.  
 
Global Information Infrastructure (GII):  The worldwide interconnection of 
communications networks, computers, databases, and consumer electronics that 
make vast amounts of information available to users.  The global information 
infrastructure encompasses a wide range of equipment, including cameras, 
scanners, keyboards, facsimile machines, computers, switches, compact disks, 
video and audio tape, cable, wire, satellites, fiber optic transmission lines, 
networks of all types, televisions, monitors, printers, and much more.  The 
friendly and adversary personnel who make decisions and handle the transmitted 
information constitute a critical component of the global information 
infrastructure (Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, 2012). 
 
Information Operations (IO):  The integrated employment,  during military 
operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of 
operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp the decision-making of 
adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (Department of 
Defense Joint Publication 1-02, 2012). 
 
Information Security (INFOSEC): The protection of information and 
information systems against unauthorized access or modification of information, 
whether in storage, processing, or transit, and against denial of service to 
authorized users (Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, 2012). 
 
Information System (IS): The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, 
and components for the collection, processing, storage, transmission, display, 
dissemination, and disposition of information (Department of Defense Joint 
Publication 1-02, 2012). 
 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS):  Intrusion detection is the process of 
monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and analyzing 
them for signs of possible incidents, which are violations or imminent threats of 
violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard 
security practices.  Incidents have many causes, such as malware (e.g., worms, 
spyware), attackers gaining unauthorized access to systems from the Internet, 
and authorized users of systems who misuse their privileges or attempt to gain 
additional privileges for which they are not authorized (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2007). 
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Intrusion Detection and Protection System (IDPS):  An intrusion detection 
system (IDS) is software that automates the intrusion detection process (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2007). 
 
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS):  An intrusion prevention system (IPS) is 
software that has all the capabilities of an intrusion detection system and can 
also attempt to stop possible incidents (U.S. Department of Commerce, National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2007). 
 
Logic Bombs:  In programming, a form of sabotage in which a programmer 
inserts code that causes the program to perform a destructive action when some 
triggering event occurs.  (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004). 
 
Malware:  Malware is a category of malicious code that includes viruses, worms, 
and Trojan horses (Symantec, 2012). 
 
National Information Infrastructure (NII):  The nationwide interconnection 
of communications networks, computers, databases, and consumer electronics 
that make vast amounts of information available to users.  The national 
information infrastructure encompasses a wide range of equipment, including 
cameras, scanners, keyboards, facsimile machines, computers, switches, 
compact disks, video and audio tape, cable, wire, satellites, fiber optic 
transmission lines, networks of all types, televisions, monitors, printers, and 
much more.  The friendly and adversary personnel who make decisions and 
handle the transmitted information constitute a critical component of the national 
information infrastructure (Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, 2012). 
 
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC):  A programmable microprocessor-
based device that is used in discrete manufacturing to control assembly lines and 
machinery on the shop floor as well as many other types of mechanical, electrical 
and electronic equipment in a plant (The Computer Language Company, 2012). 
 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA):  Software for 
networks of devices that control the operation of a system of machines such as 
valves, pumps, generators, transformers and robotic arms.  SCADA software 
collects information about the condition of and activities on a system.  SCADA 
software sends unencrypted instructions to devices, often to do physical 
movements.  Instructions sent to devices on SCADA networks are sometimes 
sent over the Internet or broadcast via radio waves (Clarke and Knake, 2010). 
 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP):  The format 
used to divide information such as emails into digital “packets” each with its own 
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to and from data so that the packet can be routed on the internet (Clarke and 
Knake, 2010).   
 
Trojan Horse:  Computer program that conceals harmful code.  A Trojan horse 
usually masquerades as a useful program that a user would wish to execute 
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004).   
 
Virus: A program that ‘infects’ computer files, usually executable programs, by 
inserting a copy of itself into the file. These copies are usually executed when 
the ‘infected’ file is loaded into memory, allowing the virus to infect other files 
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004). 
 
Worm:  Independent computer program that reproduces by copying itself from 
one system to another across a network (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004). 
 
Zero-Day Vulnerability:  Zero-day vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities against 
which no vendor has released a patch. The absence of a patch for a zero-day 
vulnerability presents a threat to organizations and consumers alike, because in 
many cases these threats can evade purely signature-based detection until a 
patch is released. The unexpected nature of zero-day threats is a serious 
concern, especially because they may be used in targeted attacks and in the 
propagation of malicious code (Symantec, 2012). 
